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Abstract
This paper analyses the underlying dynamics of business cycles in the EU-
15. Existing literature mainly focuses on the comovement of expansion and
contraction phases, while this paper seeks to test the idiosyncrasy of busi-
ness cycles by studying growth pattern and deepness of industrial production.
Hypotheses are tested using formal statistical methods while much existing
literature in this ﬁeld rely on judgements of correlation coeﬃcients. The re-
sults obtained here does not give much rise to concern about the possibility
of the ECB to choose an appropriate timing and magnitude of changes in
monetary policy in order to satisfy the economic development in its member
countries.
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Up to the launch of the EMU’s third stage many critics argued that a “one-size-ﬁts-
all” monetary policy would be incapable of ensuring economic stability due to too
large disparities in economic and institutional fundamentals across the European
countries. This discussion has once again become relevant with the prospects of
up to ten new countries joining the EU maybe already from 2004. In the longer
run even an enrolment to the EMU’s third stage might be a possibility for these
countries.
At the same time the debate whether to join the common currency or not has
once again been sparked oﬀ in the UK, Sweden and Denmark. Very recently, Tow-
nend [2002], emphasized that letting UK join the third stage might not necessarily
be without problems. Townend [2002] emphasized that “[..] the economic condi-
tions are obviously important, if the UK is to live comfortably with the ‘one size ﬁts
all’ monetary policy of the euro area”.
No doubt, it is important for economic fundamentals to some extend to be
equal across countries and for business cycles to show some degree of cross-country-
symmetry for a single monetary policy to be appropriate for this large group of
countries. A large amount of studies have during the nineties focused on this prob-
lem and searched for the existence of a common European business cycle. These
studies can roughly be grouped into two directions of research: the traditional1 way
of distinguishing between diﬀerent phases of the business cycle by picking peaks
1The approach, that I in this paper denote “traditional”, is often called the “classical” approach;
however, with the term “classical business cycles” I shall refer to business cycles found on basis
of the level of some economic time series. Business cycles found on account of a growth or cyclical
component, i.e. a cyclical component found by the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter as done in section 4.2,
will be denoted a “growth cycle”.
1and troughs with the Bry & Boschan [1971] procedure related to the methodology
of Burns & Mitchell [1946] and the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee. The
modern approach, stemming from the inﬂuential work of Hamilton [1989], takes
advance of regime switching models that assume the economy is to be found in one
of a number of diﬀerent states, and where the probability of moving from one state
to another is contingent on the current state.
This paper applies the traditional approach to examine the behavior of the
business cycle in the various EU member countries. To some extend the paper
complements the work of Artis et al. [1997, 1998], Christodoulakis et al. [1995]
and Krolzig & Toro [2001]. Artis et al. [1997] propose classical business cycle
turning points for the G7 and a number of European countries based on industrial
production, i.e. troughs and peaks found on account of the level of industrial
production. Pearson’s corrected contingency coeﬃcient is used to determine the
degree of comovement of expansions and contractions across countries, and the
conclusion is in favor of a common business cycle. The same conclusion is obtained
by Artis et al. [1998] with the use of regime switching models. In a convincing way
these papers show that troughs and peaks take place at almost the same time in
the various European countries.
However, what still remains to be examined is the behavior of the business cycle
between the peaks and troughs. Two approaches are worth taking care of, when
talking about the underlying dynamics of the business cycle. First, the growth
pattern is likely to show a large degree of variation across countries; the transition
from a peak to a through, et vice versa, is likely to diﬀer from country to country.
Second, the severity of recessions might show large variation across countries. The
2ﬁrst approach is important since a lack of a uniform growth pattern will make the
choice of timing changes in monetary policy a diﬃcult task for the ECB if it is
to take care of the economic development in all its member countries. The second
approach is of importance when picking the optimal size of changes in monetary
policy.
This paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature by giving further insight
into the underlying dynamics of the business cycle. At the same time the analysis
oﬀers a way of testing hypotheses regarding the conformity of business cycles across
countries by using formal statistical methods. Most hypotheses in this ﬁeld of
research have so far been tested by evaluating whether a given correlation coeﬃcient
returns a “low” value or not, and more formal methods would be preferable.
Using the traditional approach for selecting turning points in industrial produc-
tion in the EU and examining the dynamics between the troughs and peaks, this
paper concludes that not much evidence gives support for the concern expressed by
Townend [2002]. In fact, only very few signs of individual countries’ business cycles
deviating signiﬁcantly from the aggregated European business cycle is found. This
is a conclusion that enhances the ﬁndings of Artis et al. [1997, 1998].
Together with Artis et al. [1997, 1998] this paper comes up with two results in
favor of the possibility of leading a common monetary policy. First, the conclusions
of Artis et al. [1997, 1998] indicate that the timing of changes in monetary policy
can be set almost appropriate for all countries at the same time. A conclusion that
is enhanced by the present study. Second, this paper adds hereto that the severity
of recessions are almost equal across countries, which means that also the magnitude
of adjustments of monetary policy, i.e. the size of rate changes, can be set to a value
3acceptable for most countries.
This rest of this paper goes as follows: In section 2 the theoretical framework is
being described, data is presented in section 3 and section 4 provides the ﬁndings.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
First, the underlying patterns of the business cycles in the various EU member
countries are compared. The comparison is done to the reference business cycle
which is chosen to be the OECD EU-15 aggregate. Second, it is examined whether
the severity of recessions in terms of deepness or horizontal asymmetry, diﬀer across
countries. In both aspects data for industrial production is used.
2.1 Pattern of the European business cycles
O n ep o s s i b l ew a yt oﬁnd a pattern of the business cycle is to distinguish between
diﬀerent growth phases over the business cycle. For doing so I revert to the method-
ology of Burns & Mitchell [1946]. The Burns & Mitchell deﬁnition of a business
cycle can be summarized in the highly quoted section of Burns & Mitchell [1946,
pp. 3].
“Business cycles are a type of ﬂuctuation found in the aggregate eco-
nomic activity of nations that organize their work mainly in business
enterprises: a cycle consists of expansions occurring at about the same
time in many economic activities, followed by similarly general reces-
sions, contractions, and revivals which merge into the expansion phases
of the next cycle; this sequence of changes is recurrent but not periodic;
4in duration business cycles vary from more than one year to ten or twelve
years; they are not divisible into shorter cycles of similar character with
amplitudes approximating their own”
Several points are worth noting in relation to this deﬁnition. First, business
cycles cannot be determined from a single time series, unless this in itself reﬂects
“the aggregate economic activity”. This will very likely never be the case. Second,
a business cycle is deﬁned to two overall phases; the expansion phase and the
contraction phase. This distinction requires a way of determining peaks and troughs
of a given time series. Third, “aggregate economic activity of nations” calls for a
measure of the business cycle related to the levels of the observed time series.2
Today the oﬃcial US peaks and troughs are determined by the NBER Busi-
ness Cycle Dating Committee. The methodology behind this follows the Burns
& Mitchell [1946] deﬁnition in the sense that a business cycle are not determined
from the development in a single time series. Bry & Boschan [1971] developed an
algorithm aiming at mimicking the peak and trough dates found by the NBER
and in line with the initial requirements proposed by Burns & Mitchell [1946]. In
short, the algorithm is a mechanical way of determining turning points in a highly
smoothed time series, but it breaks with the NBER and Burns & Mitchell [1946]
methodology since it, in fact, relies on a single time series. I use a slightly modiﬁed
version of this algorithm to ﬁnd troughs and peaks, and I apply it to only industrial
production in the various countries.3 See the next section for a presentation of the
data.
2For a further discussion of these issues, see Pedersen [1999, ch. 5].
3See appendix A for an overview of details on the Bry & Boschan methodology and for an
elaboration of the modiﬁc a t i o n su s e di nt h i ss t u d y .
5H a v i n gf o u n dt h et r o u g h sa n dp e a k so ft h et i m es e r i e si ti ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt o
split the business cycles into sub-phases in accordance with Burns & Mitchell [1946,
pp. 144]. More speciﬁcally, the three months centered on a peak is denoted “phase
1”, while the three months centered on a through is denoted “phase 5”. “Phase 2”
to “phase 4” are phases of equal length covering the time from “phase 1” to “phase
5”, while “phase 6” to “phase 8” cover the time from “phase 5” to “phase 1”.4,5
Figure 1. The 8 phases of the business cycle
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Finally, I follow Balke & Wynne [1995] a n do b t a i na v e r a g eg r o w t hr a t e se s t i -
mates in each phase using phase dummies and apply Chow tests, cf. Chow [1960],
4Symmetry is imposed in the sense that the length of phase 2 is required to equal the length of
phase 4. Similarly phase 6 and phase 8 are required to be of equal length. Therefore the length of
phase 3 (phase 7) may diﬀer with 1 observation from phase 2 and phase 4 (phase 6 and phase 8).
5In this context one should be aware of the interesting papers by Sichel [1993] and Layton &
Smith [2000] who suggest that the US business cycle consists of three phases; contraction, rapid
expansion and normal expansion.
6to compare growth rates in the diﬀerent phases with the reference business cycle,
w h i c hi st h eE U - 1 5b u s i n e s sc y c l e .



















where γEU and γi are vectors containing the growth rates of industrial production
in EU respectively country i, Xi are (ni × 8) matrices containing dummy variables
describing which phase the corresponding growth rate belongs to, ni is the number of
observations regarding country i,a n dεi are error terms. The OLS estimates of βEU
and βi, ˆ βEU and ˆ βi, will be identical to average growth rates in the corresponding
phase. Standard deviations of the OLS estimates must be obtained using the Newey-
West covariance estimator to eliminate serial correlation. When constructing the
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation consistent covariance matrix, I follow Sichel
[1993] and Newey & West [1987] and allow for a serial correlation up to order six.
This results from taking the integer part of the sample size raised to the 1/3 power.
15 comparisons are thereby done; one between the business cycle in each member
country, i, and the total EU-15 business cycle by testing the hypotheses βj,EU = βj,i
for j =1 ,2,...,8 where j is the number of the corresponding phase.
2.2 Severity of recessions
Measuring the severity of the typical recession is done by constructing a measure
of the deepness of the business cycle identical to the one that Sichel [1993] used for
his study of the US business cycle.
In this aspect it is not appropriate to work with the levels of time series since it
on the contrary is the deviation from natural output that is of interest. Therefore,
7one should instead apply detrended time series and focus on the cyclical component
deﬁned as the distance between the actual production and the output trend level.6
To ensure this distinction between a trend component and a cyclical component,
I rely on the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, which is widely used in this context, cf. Hodrick
& Prescott [1997]. I set the smoothing parameter equal to 129.600 as suggested by
Ravn & Uhlig [1997] when working with monthly observations. I eliminate the ﬁrst
and last three years of observations due to the end-point problems related to the
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, cf. Baxter & King [1995] and Cogley & Nason [1995].








where ¯ c is the mean of ct,σ(c) is the standard deviation of ct and T is the size of
the sample.
Figure 2 below gives three examples of a given time series. The ﬁrst graph
shows a time series, where the maximum distance from the mean to the peak value
is equal the maximum distance from the mean to the trough value. The middle
graph shows an example where the maximum distance from the mean to the peak
value is greater than the distance from the mean to the trough value, while the
opposite case is illustrated in the last graph. The three examples will provide
values of D(c) equal to zero, greater than zero respectively less that zero.
6This measure of the business cycle is often referred to as growth cycles and is widely used
when evaluating the predictions of a CGE model.
8Figure 2. A symmetric, “high” and “deep” business cycle — Three examples























Following Sichel [1993], I obtain an asymptotic standard deviation — the Newey-
West estimator — of D(c) by regressing
zt =




on a constant using the Newey-West standard error. The parameter estimates will



















is estimated. ZEU and Zi a r ev e c t o r sc o n t a i n i n gt h ev a l u e so fzt for EU respectively
country i, IEU and Ii are vectors containing ones, while ωEU and ωi are noise terms.
Again the comparison is done by applying the method suggested by Chow [1960],
that is testing the hypotheses ζE15 = ζi.
93D a t a
Data for industrial production in the EU countries in the period April l979 - October
2001, hereafter 1979:4 - 2001:10 is used. This beginning of the period is chosen
to respect the ﬁndings of Artis & Zhang [1997] that concludes that the ERM in
general has promoted the synchronicity of the European business cycles, and that
the similarity of European business cycles is to be found in another regime hereafter.
Data is drawn from OECD Main Economic Indicators, see appendix B for spe-
ciﬁc codes and for mnemonics used in this paper.
Looking at industrial production instead of the overall measure of activity —
GDP — has at least two advantages. First, data for industrial production is released
on a monthly basis instead of GDP, which is only released on a quarterly basis.
Second, policy makers should — at least in the short run — pay more attention to
this ﬁgure, since the release of industrial production leads the release of GDP. To
some extend GDP ﬁgures can be said to contain a large amount of already known
information before its release, and monetary policy may very well have been changed
ahead of the release.
The obvious disadvantage by using industrial production instead of overall activ-
ity measured by GDP is that industrial production does only tell about the economic
climate in a part of the economy. Furthermore, the share of industrial output rela-
tive to overall output has in general dropped over the last decades. Therefore the
aggregate business cycle may to a higher degree diﬀer from the industrial business
cycle than years ago.
In this paper, the analysis is restricted to the members of the EU, which are
t h e1 2c o u n t r i e sp a r t i c i p a t i n gi nt h eE M U ’ st h i r ds t a g ea sw e l la sU K ,S w e d e na n d
10Denmark who has chosen to stand out. It would be obvious to extend the analysis
to include the Eastern European countries that are expected to join the EU and
who one day even might be a member of the euro-zone. Unfortunately, there do
not seem to exist any time series for industrial production going satisfactory long
back in time for this purpose, so this operation will have to be unexplored.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Pattern of the European business cycles
Industrial production is a highly volatile ﬁgure. To eliminate some of the volatility a
3 month centered moving average is used. The determination of peaks and troughs
is still based on the raw series, but before estimating (1) the moving average is
applied. This transformation of data can be seen in appendix D.
The estimates of βi for i = E15,D E U ,F R A ,I T A ,E S P ,N L D ,B E L ,A U T ,
L U X ,FI N ,PR T ,G R C ,U K ,S WE ,D N Kare reported in Table 1.7
7Ireland is not included in this part of the analysis. The reason is that Ireland experiences a
trough in 1980:12 and a peak in 2001:2. Thereby, there is not enough turning points to constitute
a full cycle, and therefore no sub-phases have been determined.
11Table 1 — Average growth rates
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7 Phase 8
E15 0,02 -0,13 -0,30 -0,36 -0,25 0,27 0,25 0,24
(0,1116) (0,1265) (0,1048) (0,0777) (0,1965) (0,0562) (0,0444) (0,0534)
DEU 0,12 -0,54 -0,20 -0,47 -0,17 0,37 0,36 0,32
(0,1328) (0,1087) (0,1869) (0,1225) (0,1004) (0,0534) (0,0922) (0,0915)
FRA 0,15 -0,27 -0,45 -0,37 -0,10 0,14 0,25 0,12
(0,0398) (0,0403) (0,1667) (0,0901) (0,1264) (0,0542) (0,0829) (0,0593)
ITA 0,21 -0,36 -0,15 -0,25 -0,33 0,45 0,36 0,26
(0,1088) (0,2487) (0,0459) (0,1174) (0,1515) (0,1161) (0,0689) (0,0852)
ESP 0,14 -0,40 -0,34 -0,33 -0,17 0,32 0,36 0,43
(0,0729) (0,1544) (0,2559) (0,1669) (0,1404) (0,1014) (0,0793) (0,0838)
NLD 0,66 -0,56 -0,36 0,17 -0,26 0,54 0,28 0,14
(0,2824) (0,2509) (0,0777) (0,2792) (0,3138) (0,1318) (0,1162) (0,0908)
BEL 0,58 -0,40 -0,34 -0,27 -0,19 0,43 0,29 0,21
(0,2155) (0,0857) (0,2504) (0,1482) (0,0916) (0,0498) (0,1173) (0,1154)
AUT 0,55 -0,30 -0,21 -0,18 -0,32 0,41 0,51 0,49
(0,1246) (0,1444) (0,0970) (0,1472) (0,1482) (0,0905) (0,0898) (0,1073)
LUX 1,18 -0,42 -0,28 -0,03 -0,63 0,68 0,24 0,42
(0,4236) (0,5094) (0,1151) (0,3149) (0,3904) (0,2570) (0,1448) (0,2011)
FIN 0,71 -0,51 -0,28 -0,77 -0,09 0,55 0,42 0,43
(0,1247) (0,0851) (0,3722) (0,2244) (0,0448) (0,0960) (0,1339) (0,1231)
PRT 0,30 -0,26 -0,43 -0,23 0,16 0,60 0,27 0,50
(0,2606) (0,2068) (0,3086) (0,1702) (0,2025) (0,1619) (0,0919) (0,1079)
GRC 0,54 -0,16 -0,34 0,01 -0,41 0,21 0,21 0,22
(0,2164) (0,2517) (0,1952) (0,1755) (0,1757) (0,1138) (0,1144) (0,1555)
UK 0,11 -0,54 -0,56 -0,26 -0,06 0,30 0,24 0,17
(0,0733) (0,1481) (0,1679) (0,0911) (0,0901) (0,0925) (0,0608) (0,0495)
SWE 0,34 -0,43 -0,17 -0,16 -0,44 0,61 0,36 0,36
(0,1792) (0,3759) (0,1719) (0,1693) (0,2539) (0,1282) (0,1061) (0,1223)
DNK 0,86 -0,57 -0,56 -0,36 0,23 0,37 0,33 0,42
(0,1739) (0,2875) (0,2913) (0,1963) (0,1761) (0,1403) (0,1451) (0,1613)
Standard deviations in parantheses
Different from EU-15 growth at a 10 percentage significance level
5 percentage significance level




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Examining Table 1 reveals only very few “wrong” signs of the estimates. This is
not surprising; the method of dividing the time series into various phases dependent
on the relative position of the particular phase to the previous peak (trough) and
t h en e x tt r o u g h( p e a k )a l m o s td e ﬁnes the sign of growth. On the contrary, the
signs of the growth rates in phase 1 and in phase 5 are not obvious. Ap r i o r ithese
12should be expected to lie close to zero since these phases cover the period where
growth goes from being negative (positive) to being positive (negative). However,
these phases include not only the turning points of the time series, but also its
two surrounding observations, and if these are not numerically equally large the
estimate should diﬀer from zero. Furthermore, growth in the turning point might
not in itself be zero.
Another conclusion to be drawn from Table 1 is that of the bigger countries
almost no growth rates in any phase diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the EU-15 business
cycle8. This is neither hardly surprising since the EU-15 industrial production by
deﬁnition is a weighted average of industrial production in the individual member
countries. This is, however, the problem in a nutshell; when attaching the largest
weights to the largest countries before aggregating and using this time series for
designing monetary policy, the risk of ignoring the economic development in the
smaller countries arises.
The risk cannot be rejected from this analysis, but it does on the other hand
not appear to be enormous. Following the results obtained here it appears that
Finland tops the list of countries having most growth phases to diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from the corresponding growth in the entire EU-15 zone. Four out of eight phases
diﬀer signiﬁcantly in Finland. Hereafter follow Netherlands, Belgium and Austria
with three phases each to diﬀer.
As a matter of fact phase 1 appears to be the phase that diﬀers the most across
countries; in 7 out of 14 countries a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent estimate is obtained when
allowing for a 5 percentage level of signiﬁc a n c e .T h i sm e a n st h a ti ti sa tt h et i m e
8Probabilities of F-tests can be found in appendix C.1.
13when growth slows down and the expansion becomes a contraction the business
cycle diﬀers across countries. On the contrary, only Denmark stands out when
talking about the trough of the business cycle, i.e. phase 5 growth.
Drawing a special attention to the three countries not participating in the third
stage of the EMU — UK, Sweden and Denmark — the analysis reveals no information
pointing towards much convergence problems regarding the overall growth pattern.
As the most “extreme” case, Denmark diﬀers in two phases if allowing for a 10
percent signiﬁcance level. The Swedish and British business cycles only diﬀer in
one phase each.
This result enhances the ﬁndings of Artis et al. [1997, 1998] and speaks in favor
of the possibility of timing changes in monetary policy appropriate for the growth
situation in most countries at the same time.
4.2 Severity of recessions
While the pattern of growth over the business cycle is relevant for the timing of
changes in monetary policy, the severity, or deepness, of the business cycle is of
interest in relation to the size of changes in monetary policy. Yet, neither calculating
the coeﬃcient of skewness as deﬁned in (2) for the various countries gives rise to
any immediate concern about the homogeneity of the European business cycle.
T a b l e2—C o e ﬃcient of deepness
E15 DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD BEL AUT
-0,66 0,00 -0,38 -0,23 -0,49 0,15 -0,80 0,17
(0,6939) (0,6189) (0,5137) (0,4082) (0,6104) (0,3388) (0,6541) (0,3633)
LUX FIN PRT GRC IRL UK SWE DNK
-0,20 -0,30 -0,12 -1,01 0,20 -0,32 -0,44 -0,09
(0,4998) (0,4773) (0,4696) (1,0745) (0,5182) (0,3933) (0,6570) (0,4686)
Standard deviations in parantheses
Not a single hypothesis suggesting that any country has a recession deeper than
14the recession in the total EU-15 area can be accepted. This would require hypotheses
to be tested at a 29 percent signiﬁcance level in which the recession in Austria would
be signiﬁcantly less deep than the EU-15 business cycle.9 This is an important
observation that gives an indication of to what extend a typical recession will hurt
employment and activity in general. The results presented in Table 2 therefore do
n o tg i v er i s et om u c hc o n c e r na b o u tt h ep o s s i b i l i t yo fl e a d i n gac o m m o nm o n e t a r y
policy in order to neutralize the negative impact of a recession on employment.
The results instead point towards that the optimal level of monetary medicine to
be donated from the ECB does not diﬀer much between countries.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This study has in a new way applied traditional methods to test the European
business cycle conformity across countries. The debate about business cycle asym-
metries across European countries has been going on for years up to the launch of
the EMU’s third stage, and the debate has once again become relevant due to the
expected inclusion of the Eastern European countries in the EU.
It is shown that the underlying dynamics of the business cycle does not diﬀer
much across countries. This result speaks in favor of the possibility of timing
changes in monetary policy appropriate for the growth situation in most countries
at the same time. Furthermore, it is shown that neither the severity of recessions,
measured in terms of deepness, diﬀe r sm u c ha c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .T h i ss p e a k si nf a v o r
of the possibility of ﬁnding an optimal level of monetary policy adjustment at a
given point in time.
9Probabilities of F-tests can be found in appendix C.2.
15The conclusion therefore is that the ﬁndings obtained here do not give rise
to much concern about the possibility of designing a single European monetary
policy appropriate for most countries. However, this study — just as most of the
studies in this ﬁeld — founds its conclusions on time series of industrial production.
This is a problem since the ECB has committed themselves very strictly to let the
development of prices in the medium-term run be of primary concern.
It is by far given that the development of prices show the same degree of co-
movement across countries as industrial production does, and diﬀerent results may
be obtained when taking this into account. Research on the homogeneity of devel-
opment in prices should be given a high priority in the future.
The study also supports the conclusion of Artis et al. [1997] that emphasizes the
need for taking inter-country eﬀects into account when searching for sources behind
business cycles, since only few business cycles are conﬁned to single countries.
166 Appendix
A The Bry & Boschan [1971] algorithm
PROCEDURE FOR PROGRAMMED
DETERMINATION OF TURNING POINTS
I. Determination of extremes and substitution of values.
II. Determination of cycles in 12-month moving average (extremes replaced).
A. Identiﬁcation of points higher (or lower) than 5 months on either side.
B. Enforcement of alternation of turns by selecting highest of
multiple peaks (or lowest of multiple troughs).
III. Determination of corresponding turns in Spencer curve (extremes replaced).
A. Identiﬁcation of highest (or lowest) value within
± 5 months of selected turn in 12-month moving average.
B. Enforcement of minimum cycle duration of 15 months by eliminating
lower peaks and higher troughs of shorter cycles.
IV. Determination of corresponding turns in short-term moving average of 3 to
6 months, depending on MCD (months of cyclical domincance).
A. Identiﬁcation of highest (or lowest) value within
±5 months of selected turn in Spencer curve.
V. Determination of corresponding turns in unsmoothed series.
A. Identiﬁcation of highest (or lowest) value within
±4 months, or MCD term, whichever is larger, of selected
turn in short-term moving average.
B. Elimination of turns within 6 months of beginning and end of
series.
C. Elimination of peaks (or troughs) at both ends of series which are
lower (or higher) than values closer to end.
D. Elimination of cycles whose duration is less than 15 months
E. Elimination of phases whose duration is less than 5 months∗
VI. Statement of ﬁnal turning points.
Source: Bry & Boschan [1971, Table 1, pp. 21].
∗ Requirement V.E is modiﬁed in this study: Instead of requiring a given phase
to have a length of at least 5 months, it is in this study required to have a length
of at least 6 months. If a phase, i.e. a contraction, consisting of only 5 months is
observed, there would not be enough observations for reserving two observations for
17phase 1, one observation for phase 2, phase 3 and phase 4 each, and one observation
for phase 5 — this would require at least 6 observations. Remember that the two
months surrounding a turning point is included in that particular phase, cf. Figure
1.
BD a t a s o u r c e s
All data are drawn from the OECD Main Economic Indicators database at UniDa,
http://unida.uni-c.dk/
Country Code Country Code
AUT Austria autprpein01ios ITA Italy itaprpein01ios
BEL Belgium belprpein01ios LUX Luxembourg luxprpein01ios
DNK Denmark dnkprpein01ios NLD Netherlands nldprpein01ios
FIN Finland ﬁnprpein01ios PRT Portugal prtprpein01ios
FRA France fraprpein01ios ESP Spain espprpein01ios
DEU Germany deuprpein01ios SWE Sweden sweprpein01ios
GRC Greece grcprpein01ios GBR UK gbrprpein01ios
IRL Ireland irlprpein01ios E15 EU-15 e15prpein01ios
18C Tests of growth being equal to growth in EU-
15
C.1 Pattern of the European business cycles
Probabilities for F-values for tests of growth
b e i n ge q u a lt oE U - 1 5g r o w t h
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7 Phase 8
E15 ……………………
DEU 0,5087 0,0132 0,6438 0,4245 0,7240 0,2405 0,2505 0,4513
FRA 0,2630 0,3055 0,4425 0,9097 0,5257 0,0842 0,9741 0,1439
ITA 0,1848 0,4018 0,1904 0,4604 0,7439 0,1801 0,1709 0,7979
ESP 0,3391 0,1762 0,8824 0,8845 0,7466 0,6817 0,2141 0,0595
NLD 0,0347 0,1302 0,6158 0,0709 0,9762 0,0659 0,7582 0,3320
BEL 0,0201 0,0760 0,8819 0,5915 0,7958 0,0373 0,7165 0,8338
AUT 0,0007 0,3706 0,5280 0,2922 0,7633 0,2191 0,0086 0,0392
LUX 0,0082 0,5822 0,8952 0,3152 0,3780 0,1237 0,9743 0,3854
FIN 0,0000 0,0131 0,9766 0,0824 0,4281 0,0148 0,2122 0,1545
PRT 0,3407 0,5816 0,6726 0,5073 0,1461 0,0547 0,7730 0,0272
GRC 0,0320 0,9082 0,8264 0,0537 0,5333 0,6012 0,7498 0,9205
UK 0,4999 0,0377 0,1767 0,4370 0,3951 0,8492 0,9858 0,3465
SWE 0,1142 0,4517 0,5223 0,2798 0,5592 0,0168 0,3383 0,3616
DNK 0,0000 0,1615 0,3898 0,9771 0,0710 0,5483 0,5801 0,2827
C.2 Severity of recessions
Probabilities for F-values for tests of deepness
being equal to EU-15 deepness
E15 DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD BEL AUT
… 0,4827 0,7521 0,5974 0,8588 0,2953 0,8807 0,2901
LUX FIN PRT GRC IRL UK SWE DNK
0,5898 0,6758 0,5226 0,7810 0,3253 0,6687 0,8223 0,4958
19D Smoothing industrial production
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